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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE-WILL LIBERALISM
PREVAIL?
Michael A. Schmitt*
and
Michael Pasterczyk**
The extraordinary remedy of specific performance rarely was
available to a buyer at common law. This Article illustrates how
the Uniform Commercial Code intentionally broadened the pos-
sibility of specific performance as a buyer's remedy. This exten-
sion is accomplished by a general mandate for liberal interpreta-
tion and an expansion of the uniqueness requirement to include
"other proper circumstances" when specific performance should
be granted. The authors conclude with a recommendation that
equitable principles govern the situations when a buyer's de-
mand for specific performance conflicts with a seller's defense
of commercial impracticability.
INTRODUCTION
Fundamental to any discussion of specific performance under
the Uniform Commercial Code is a basic understanding of those
concepts which form the essence of the law of contracts. The
power to breach a contract historically has been almost as sacred
as the freedom to form a contract. From the earliest days of
mercantile dealings, judicial thinking has placed greatest empha-
sis on those principles that would best lubricate the comings and
goings of the marketplace.'
In the traditional case of a seller who breaches his promise to
deliver certain goods, the aggrieved buyer usually must settle for
whatever damages he sustains in procuring those goods else-
where. But assuming that our first priority always is to facilitate
commerce and promote commercial stability,2 might not there be
* Associate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School,
1973; Admitted to State of Connecticut Bar, 1974.
** J.D., Western New England College School of Law, 1976.
1. A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES §1-1,1-2,1-3,1-4 (4th ed. 1973); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 100-01 (1972).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (hereinafter cited as UCC] states that under-
lying purposes and policies of the UCC are:
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certain instances when enforcing the contract will best serve that
end? The answer, of course, must be in the affirmative; but the
granting of specific performance is precisely the problem that has
plagued judges, draftsmen, and legislators for what continues to
be an inordinate period of time.
Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code offers a statu-
tory scheme which "seeks to further a more liberal attitude than
some courts have shown in connection with . . . specific
performance . . . ."I The effectiveness of this scheme, however,
has come under serious attack. For example, Professor Nordstrom
claims "the best way to summarize the Code's position as to
specific performance . . . [is to say that] courts are free to go
on doing what they did before the Code and the best prediction
of the shape of the future law is that they probably will do just
that."4 Nordstrom also argues that Code draftsmen may have
made specific performance more difficult to obtain than it was
under its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act.'
Whatever the truth may be, the foregoing discussion serves to
illustrate the state of confusion that currently reigns over the
realm of specific performance. With this in mind, we hope to offer
a clear analysis and discussion of this troublesome topic. Begin-
ning with the general background of equity jurisdiction as it ex-
isted at common law, this Article will trace the development of
specific performance through pre-Code and post-Code case law.
In particular, it will explore the "other proper circumstances"
test of Section 2-716 as the key to the liberalization of the specific
performance doctrine in the Code.' The inevitable conflict be-
tween a liberalized specific performance decree, forcing a seller
to deliver the goods, and a liberalized commercial impractica-
bility defense, permitting a seller not to deliver the goods at all,
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
3. UCC §2-716, Comment 1.
4. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 480 (1970).
5. Id.
6. UCC §2-716(1) reads: "Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances." (emphasis added).
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then will be analyzed From this analysis we hope to offer a
more complete understanding of when and how Section 2-716 can
be used to meet the commercial needs of the 1970's.
THE EQUITABLE ORIGINS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
At common law, courts of equity refused to grant an injunction
or issue a decree for specific performance when it was possible for
the wronged party to find an adequate remedy at law. The typical
case was one in which monetary damages could be ascertained
completely and justly by the court. The equity court's most po-
tent weapon, it seems, was its ability to exercise discretion when
determining whether to hear a case. To this end, such well-known
judicial maxims as "the clean hands doctrine" and "he who seeks
equity must also do equity" were often important factors in deter-
mining whether a plaintiff even penetrated the portals of the
courtroom.!
The remedy of specific performance traditionally has been lim-
ited to those situations in which monetary damages would not put
the injured party in as good a position as would enforcement of
contractual obligations. "Nothing less than the acquisition of the
particular thing contracted for will satisfy the needs of the plain-
tiff or do him complete justice"' was the rule used for determining
when to grant specific performance.
The right to a decree for specific performance was neither uni-
versal nor absolute, and in this respect the term "right" is proba-
bly a misnomer. The only type of good that ever has been unique
per se is land. This is a traditional belief founded on the assump-
tion that since no two parcels of land are exactly alike, an ag-
grieved buyer has no satisfactory alternative remedies available.
Equity courts later modified their closed-door position regarding
7. UCC §2-615(a) reads:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . .is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation
or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
8. J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS §12, at 32 (3d
ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY].
9. W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §67, at 156 (1950).
[Vol. 26:54
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personalty and began to decree specific performance in the case
of a contract where personalty was not obtainable on the open
market, or obtainable only at great trouble or expense.'9
The general rule developed that specific performance could be
granted when damages were an inadequate remedy and a grant
of specific performance would be practical." Thus, such chattels
as an original daVinci or the family jewels would be prime candi-
dates for a decree of specific performance. The uniqueness, per-
sonal interest, or rarity of such items worked to transform them
from common goods to what Pomeroy called pretium affectionis.2
There were, however, three important exceptions to the rule of
pretium affectionis when applied to personalty.'" The first in-
volved the situation in which the pecuniary value of the goods in
question had been fixed by the parties. In the typical situation,
the owner of the goods and the party seeking to acquire them
would include a market value as one of the dickered terms of their
agreement. The setting of a market value gave the court of equity
a hook upon which it readily could hang its "no jurisdiction" hat.
A second area in which a decree for specific performance would
be denied at common law was a contract that involved personal
services. The denial was not based on how calculable monetary
damages would be, but upon the fact that courts did not possess
the enforcement capability necessary for such a compelling de-
cree.' 4 The third situation involved those instances when the
terms were unfair. In other words, the court wanted to make sure
that one who was seeking equity also was doing equity.'5 If a
contract was not free of ambiguity, the task of insuring that its
enforcement did not impose any difficult or unconscionable terms
on a party to the contract became extremely difficult, if not im-
possible. As a result, the request for specific performance would
be denied.
Early American case law adopted the rules promulgated by the
common law courts of equity.'" However, the elusive nature of the
10. Id. §71, at 162.
11. S. WILUSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §1418, at 651 (3d ed. 1968).
12. POMEROY, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id. §310, at 683.
15. O'Brien v. Hamill, 147 Misc. 709, 264 N.Y.S. 557 (1933).
16. POMEROY, supra note 8.
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specific performance criteria and its discretionary character
called for some kind of codification of this equitable remedy for
the emerging commercial world.
EARLY CODIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: THE UNIFORM
SALES ACT
The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
the Uniform Sales Act in 1906, and the Act was adopted between
1907 and 1941 in 36 states and the District of Columbia. Section
68 of the U.S.A. codified the equitable remedy of specific per-
formance. 7 The language of Section 68 indicates a definite, if not
explicit, desire on the drafters' part to liberalize the availability
of specific performance decrees in commercial dealings."8
At common law, courts of equity refused to grant specific per-
formance when monetary damages were ascertainable. The
courts felt that when damages could be calculated with some
certainty, an adequate legal remedy was available which pre-
cluded equitable relief."9 Even when specific performance was
extended from real property to personalty, it would be granted
only when the goods were "unique" in the sense of not being
readily available elsewhere.2"
The U.S.A. codification in Section 68, however, seemed to
broaden the conditions under which a court could order specific
performance. Courts were directed, at their discretion, to grant
specific performance when they "thought fit."'" In addition, they
could order the seller to deliver the goods even if he was willing
17. UNIFORM SALES ACT §68 [hereinafter cited as USA] reads:
Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods,
a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks fit, on the
application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree, direct that the contract shall
be performed specifically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the
goods on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be unconditional,
or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price and
otherwise, as the court may deem just.
18. See Comment, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-What "Other Proper Circumstances"?, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 243 (1971); S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §601 (3d ed. 1968); Oreland Equip. Co.
v. Copco Steel & Eng'r Corp., 310 Mich. 6, 16 N.W.2d 646 (1944).
19. W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §67, at 156 (1950).
20. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §1418, at 651 (3d ed. 1968).
21. USA §68.
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simply to pay the buyer damages for the breach." Of course, the
circumstances had to be such that a specific performance decree
would "seem just." 3 Certainly implied in this codification was
the notion that the common law requirement of an inadequate
remedy at law was no longer a hard and fast rule. Indeed, even if
monetary damages were ascertainable, a court could decree spe-
cific performance in cases it "thought fit." 4
Early cases making use of Section 68 did not stray immediately
from the developed common law principles. Real estate remained
the favored domain for invoking a decree of specific performance,
but exceptions for personal property continued to be carved out.
A liquor license was found to be a "unique" kind of personal
property not readily available on the market. As such, a decree
for specific performance was granted. 5 Similarly, a license issued
by the Interstate Commerce Commission was found to be a
"unique" chattel, and specific performance was decreed." What
is interesting about these cases, however, is that monetary dam-
ages probably could have been ascertained so as to provide an
adequate legal remedy. The courts "thought fit" to grant specific
performance in both cases, even though damages could be calcu-
lated. A liberalization of the common law principles began.
By 1950, courts began to recognize publicly both the impact of
Section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act and the "growing tendency"
to liberalize the requirements for specific performance. There
22. Id. Note especially the words, "without giving the seller the option of... payment
of damages."
23. Id. Note especially the last phrase, "as the court may deem just."
24. Id. Note especially the words, "if it thinks fit."
25. See Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 335 Pa. 357, 49 A.2d 692 (1946).
26. See McCormick Dray Lines, Inc. v. Lovell, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 464, 2 Lyc. Rep. 55
(1957).
27. See Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950). Bomberger
involved the demolition of an old building and the inclusion of certain salvageable materi-
als from it in the construction of a new building. The materials in question, namely plate-
glass and skylights, were scarce at the time, and could be obtained only after considerable
delay. In addition, sheet metal for skylights was under priority by reason of governmental
restriction. The plaintiffs had commenced construction of the new building when they
were informed in a letter from the defendants that they were not to dismantle the old
building. Defendants then sought a preliminary injunction to restrain plaintiffs from
dismantling the old building, which was denied. Plaintiffs proceeded to dismantle the old
building and ended up having to bring suit for payment of the price agreed upon for the
demolition. The Supreme Court of California held that:
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was little doubt that the "think fit" doctrine of Section 68 could
be read to displace the common law requirement that the remedy
at law be inadequate. And indeed, courts appeared to be a bit less
tightfisted in granting specific performance with this new codifi-
cation. 8 Section 68 merely opened a door through which some
courts passed."
A good example of how the door gradually opened is found in
Poltorak v. Jackson Chevrolet Co.30 The defendant agreed to sell
to the plaintiff a new black Chevrolet. Plaintiff traded in his car
and received $714.22 as a credit. He called the car dealer weekly
during the next six week period but the car was not sold to him.
It was discovered that the company could have sold the plaintiff
a car but simply decided it would not. The court, holding for the
plaintiff, reasoned that a decree will lie
where the buyer shows that he is unable by reason of the nature
of the subject, the conditions of the market, or other circum-
stances, to procure an article substantially similar to the one
which he contracted to buy, or that delay, expense and difficul-
ties incidental to procuring such an article will entail serious
inconvenience, loss or hardship, or that he stands in such a
relation to the article that manifest justice will not be done
unless performance is decreed."'
Thus, the test was whether damages for the breach were the
equivalent of the promised performance. 2
Some courts, however, continued to interpret restrictively the
situations in which specific performance would be decreed.33
Under these circumstances the trial court could properly conclude that inabil-
ity to obtain the salvage from the old building would seriously interfere with
completion of the new building, that equivalent materials could not then be
secured by plaintiffs, and that in an action for breach of contract damages would
be difficult to ascertain and would be inadequate.
Id. at 617, 220 P.2d at 735. The court also noted the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act
and a "growing tendency" to liberalize the requirements for specific performance of con-
tracts where damages are not the equivalent of the performance. Id. at 616-17, 220 P.2d
at 735.
28. See Boeving v. Vandover, 240 Mo.App. 117, 120, 218 S.W.2d 175, 178 (1949).
29. See, e.g., Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 57, 145 A. 378, 383
(1929).
30. 322 Mass. 699, 79 N.E.2d 285 (1948).
31. Id. at 700, 79 N.E.2d at 285-86.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Gingerich v. Protein Blenders, Inc., 250 Iowa 654, 95 N.W.2d 522 (1959)
[Vol. 26:54
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Some legal scholars still maintain that Section 68 did little to
liberalize the availability of specific performance in sales of goods
cases. 4 We are forced to take exception to such a harsh generali-
zation. In light of the cases decided under Section 68, it is argu-
able that a liberalization of sorts did occur. Williston, in his
works on Sales and Contracts, gave notice to the fact that Section
68 was intended to be a liberalization of the common law." The
Poltorak case publicly recognized the trend toward liberalization,
and the groundwork was laid for the new codification of specific
performance under the Uniform Commercial Code. This histori-
cal account of the early codification of specific performance under
the Uniform Sales Act is a necessary prerequisite for understand-
ing the subtle yet powerful changes which developed.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Although the policies behind the Uniform Sales Act either were
not followed or were ignored due to lack of specificity, the drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code detailed their intentions to
modernize commercial law in the first article of the Code." As a
general preamble, Section 1-102 of the UCC sets forth the under-
lying rationale and purposes of the Act.37 The command is explicit
and the entire Code must be read with this rationale and purpose
in mind.3" Even more supportive of a liberal interpretation of
specific performance under the UCC is Section 2-716.11 This sec-
(sale of stock was not "goods" under §76 of USA, specific performance denied); Lexington
Loose Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Coleman, 289 Ky. 277, 158 S.W.2d 633 (1942) (sale
of tobacco deemed personal property, therefore precluding the remedy of specific perform-
ance).
34. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 480 (1970).
35. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNrRAcrs §1418, at 652 (3d ed. 1968).
36. The instances where the official Comments acknowledge that a particular section
of the Code is designed to change prior case precedent are too numerous to mention. It is
sufficient to say that §1-102 sets out the overall guideline from which the Code is to be
interpreted.
37. See UCC §1-102.
38. See generally UCC § §1-102, 1-106.
39. UCC §2-716 reads:
§2-716. Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions
as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
1976]
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tion codifies the common law "uniqueness" test and the "other
proper circumstances" test,"0 which is the old "think fit" doctrine
of Section 68 of the U.S.A. The comments to Section 2-716 em-
phasize the more liberal attitude the drafters meant to encour-
age."
Section 1-106 also contains a directive to liberalize the avail-
ability of remedies. However, the comments to Section 1-106
refer us elsewhere when specific performance is sought.
Whether specific performance or other equitable relief is avail-
able is determined not by this section but by specific provisions
and by supplementary principles."2
The reader is then directed to Sections 1-103 and 2-716. Section
1-103 is the "supplementary principles" section which relates
that the "principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its
provisions. ' 43 And Section 2-716 proposes to make it clear that:
(1) the general prior policy as to specific performance and in-
junction against breach should be continued; (2) the courts'
discretion should not be impaired; (3) a more liberal attitude is
sought; (4) the test of uniqueness must be made in terms of the
total situation which characterizes the contract; (5) uniqueness
is not the sole basis of a remedy; (6) inability to cover is strong
evidence of "other proper circumstances"; (7) specific perform-
ance is no longer limited to goods which are already specific or
ascertained at the time of contracting; (8) output and require-
ments contracts involve the typical commercial specific per-
formance situation; and (9) 2-716 gives the buyer rights compa-
rable to the seller's right to the price."
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has
been made or tendered.
40. Compare USA §68, with UCC §2-716.
41. UCC §2-716, Comment 1 reads:
The present section continues in general prior policy as to specific performance
and injunction against breach. However, without intending to impair in any way
the exercise of the court's sound discretion in the matter, this Article seeks to
further a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with
the specific performance of contracts of sale.
42. UCC §1-106, Comment 2.
43. Id. §1-103.
44. Id. §2-716, Comments 1, 2 & 4.
[Vol, 26:54
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One author analyzed these codified changes and concluded that
they represent an intent to liberalize the availability of the rem-
edy of specific performance over non-statutory law.45 He appro-
priately termed these changes and comments "a liberalization of
a liberalization." 6 With the benefit of sixteen years of case law
under the UCC, it is possible to review the trends which have
emerged in the application of Section 2-716 and analyze whether
this predicted "liberalization of a liberalization" has occurred.
The Expanded Uniqueness Test of the UCC
Under the U.S.A., stocks were excluded from the definition of
goods, 7 and a contract for their sale would not be specifically
enforced under Section 68. However, a California court in Capaldi
v. Levy" granted specific performance for a stock sale, acknow-
ledging that the trend under the UCC is in the direction of
sanctioning specific performance of contracts to sell or transfer
property. In Capaldi, the broadened definition of "goods" under
the UCC became a vehicle for applying Section 2-716 to a wider
variety of factual situations.
Additionally, Section 2-716 codified the "uniqueness" test de-
veloped under common law for personalty. 9 However, the appli-
cation of the uniqueness test under the UCC has not always
meant specific performance will be granted. In one instance, an
enterprising plaintiff argued that cosmetics offered at an unu-
sually low price due to a close-out were "unique." Accordingly,
he sought specific performance. 0 The court denied the requested
relief, holding that the goods were not unique and that adequate
compensation could be had by an award of damages.5
45. Comment, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial
Code-What "Other Proper Circumstances"?, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 243 (1971).
46. Id.
47. USA §76.
48. 1 CaI.App.3d 274, 281, 81 Cal.Rptr. 629, 633 (1969).
49. UCC §2-716.
50. Hilmor Sales Co. v. Helen Neushaefer Div. of Supronics Corp., 6 UCC REP. SERV.
325 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969).
51. Id.
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The New "Other Proper Circumstances" Test of the UCC
However, under the UCC the traditional notion that goods had
to be unique to qualify for specific enforcement has been watered
down by the development of the "other proper circumstances"
test of Section 2-716.11 Obviously, one element which would make
goods unique, for all practical purposes, would be the unavailabil-
ity of the goods on the open market. Unavailability prevents the
buyer from "covering ' 5 3 under UCC Section 2-712. In Kaiser
Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp.," the court
awarded specific performance on the ground that inability to
cover sufficiently justified a decree of specific performance. Sec-
tion 2-716(1), the comments thereto, prior case law, decisions of
other jurisdictions, and the general trend toward a more liberal-
ized availability of specific performance persuaded the court that
the remedy should be available when goods cannot be covered or
replaced .
Another court, at approximately the same time, extended the
"inability to cover" concept to the situation in which the plaintiff
was financially unable to cover, even though the goods could be
purchased on the open market."6 Thus, the "other proper circum-
stances" test began to be used in cases in which courts formerly
would not have granted specific performance because the goods
were not unique.57 In a sense, courts were determining whether
the plaintiff was situated so uniquely that he was financially
unable to cover. If so, his "uniqueness" would give rise to the
"other proper circumstances" called for in Section 2-716.11 This
can be seen further in the area of automobiles, goods which
consistently were found not to be unique under the U.S.A.5" In
52. UCC §2-716.
53. UCC §2-712 and Comment 2 thereto define cover as reasonable purchase of goods
not identical with those involved but commercially usable as reasonable substitutes for
those goods due from the seller.
54. 321 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 932-33.
56. Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal.App.3d 209,
92 Cal.Rptr. 111 (Ct.App. 1971).
57. See, e.g., Hilmor Sales Co. v. Helen Neushaefer Div. of Supronics Corp., 6 UCC
REP. SERV. 325 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969).
58. UCC §2-716.
59. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §158, at 480-81 (1970).
[Vol. 26:54
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Schweber v. Rallye Motors, Inc.,6° a court granted specific per-
formance for a Rolls Royce under the "other proper circumstan-
ces" test, although not specifically identifying those circumstan-
ces. The court acknowledged that prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code automobiles were not considered
unique but held that the development of the "other proper cir-
cumstances" test now permitted this result."'
Needless to say, there have been exceptions to the trend toward
liberalization. Not always have courts felt that the facts of the
case warranted a Section 2-716 decree. In Northern Delaware
Industrial Development Corp. v. E. W Bliss Co.," a court denied
specific performance because personal services were involved and
such an order would have committed the court to supervising a
massive, complex, and unfinished construction project. 3 Basic
common law principles were followed to the letter. A court of
equity never became involved in a case in which the nature of the
remedy required enforcing an agreement in which personal serv-
ices had to be rendered. This was not because there was an ade-
quate remedy at law, but because equity courts do not possess the
means nor the ability to enforce their decrees." However, dicta
in a case involving a long-term lease indicates that personal serv-
ices in the form of continuing business relationships are within
the scope of a specific performance decree. 5
For the majority of cases, though, the liberal trend continued
to erode common law principles. Under common law, goods had
to be ascertainable for specific performance to be granted." In R.
N. Kelly Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. York," the defendant alleged
that the non-existence of cotton at the time the contract was
formed prohibited a specific performance decree. The court, con-
sidering the fact that the plaintiff was obligated to third parties,
60. 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1154 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1973).
61. Id. at 1155.
62. 245 A.2d 431 (Del. Ch. 1968).
63. Id.
64. See generally W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY (1950) and POMEROY,
supra note 8. See also Adams v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N.E. 491 (1888).
65. Division of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
66. POMEROY, supra note 8, §159 at 403.
67. 379 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D. Ga. 1973), afj'd, 494 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
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used the "other proper circumstances" test of Section 2-716 to
order specific performance."
The judicial trend toward liberal construction of Section 2-716
is apparent from the cases reviewed. This trend is consistent with
the drafters' mandate as expressed in the more flexible two-fold
test of unique goods or other proper circumstances. It is clearly
stated in Comment 1 of Section 2-716 that, "[t]his Article seeks
to further a more liberal attitude . . . in connection with the
specific performance of contracts of sale."6 This liberal trend in
the granting of specific performance certainly will encourage buy-
ers. If they can show the "other proper circumstances" when
difficulties arise under the contract, the seller will be ordered to
perform. The increased buying activity naturally expands com-
mercial transactions, which is one of the underlying purposes of
the Code.7
The Specific Performance-Commercial Impracticability
Conflict
A problem arises when Section 2-716 comes into conflict with
Section 2-615, which provides for excused performance due to
commercial impracticability. 7" When the buyer seeks perform-
ance of the contract under the liberal command of the drafters of
the Code to grant specific performance, a seller may seek a liberal
interpretation of Section 2-615 to excuse him from performing.
Resolution of this specific performance-commercial impracti-
cability conflict is especially difficult in light of the essential
liberality of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 1-102 defines
the purpose of the Code, in part, as permitting "the continued
expansion of commercial practices."72 Economic considerations
demand that this liberal interpretation be given to Section 2-6157:1
as well as to Section 2-716. The economic justification for this
position lies in the fact that if Section 2-615 is construed nar-
68. Id.
69. UCC §2-716, Comment 1.
70. Id. §1-102.
71. Id. §2-615.
72. Id. §1-102.
73. See Schmitt & WOLLSCHLAGER, Commercial Impracticability, Making the Impracti-
cable, Practicable, 81 COMM. L.J. 9, 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schmitt & Wollschla-
gerl.
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rowly, it would equate with common law impossibility. Sellers
would be inclined to avoid long-term contracts since, over a long
period of time, they would be faced with the possibility of greater
fluctuations in the market value of the goods and other unfore-
seen circumstances. 71 If, on the other hand, sellers knew that their
performance would be excused in those instances in which it
would be economically disastrous for them to comply with the
terms of the contract, they would be more willing to enter into
long-term contracts. The significance of this point, of course, is
that long-term contracts help promote economic stability. A sec-
ond justification for liberally construing Section 2-615 is the fact
that the drafters did not intend commercial impracticability to
be synonymous with common law impossibility. This is made
apparent in Comment 3 of Section 2-615 which contrasts com-
mercial impracticability with impossibility.75
The inevitable conflict between a liberal granting of specific
performance and a liberal interpretation of commercial impracti-
cability is more than a theoretical proposition. Several courts
have been forced to deal with the problem head on when unfore-
seen market changes have resulted in increased cost to the seller.
More often than not, courts have made use of the "other proper
circumstances" test of Section 2-716 to resolve the dispute.
In G.W.S. Service Stations, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,7" service
station operators sought a mandatory injunction directing Amoco
to fill all their orders for gasoline. The oil company defended on
the ground of commercial impracticability. Both parties stipu-
lated that an oil shortage existed, but the court found for the
plaintiff-gas station dealers. The court found that federal regula-
tions required a percentage allocation and that the defendant did
not comply with them. Here the court determined its own percen-
tage allocation77 instead of considering Section 2-615(b) and form-
ing its decree under Code principles of resource allocation.
74. Id. at 15.
75. UCC §2-615, Comment 3 reads in part:
The additional test of commercial impracticability (as contrasted with
"impossibility," . . .) has been adopted in order to call attention to the com-
mercial character of the criterion chosen by this Article.
76. 75 Misc.2d 40, 346 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup.Ct. 1973).
77. Id. at 44, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
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G. W.S. Service Stations goes to our problem concerning the
effect of commercial impracticability on specific performance.
Comments to Section 2-615 seem to suggest that the defense of
commercial impracticability would prevail as a "severe shortage
of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as...
unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply. . . is within the
contemplation of this section." 8 In G. W.S. Service Station basic
equity and the requirements under Section 2-716 led to the in-
junction which plaintiff sought.
The interrelation between commercial impracticability and
specific performance again was at issue in Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Mason Coal, Inc." The TVA accepted a bid of $8.48 for
coal in October of 1973. A month later, the price rose to $13.93,
allegedly due to the energy crisis. TVA sought an injunction re-
straining the defendant from selling or disposing of any coal until
its obligations under the existing contract were fulfilled.
In granting the injunction, the court said that "in determining
the unique character of this contract, the court must look beyond
the property of the subject matter itself to the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the present time. Accordingly, the scarcity of raw
fuel materials can make an otherwise common product assume a
unique character."8I The uniqueness of the situation and the type
of contract therein, basic output and requirement, combined to
give the coal a unique status due to its scarcity.
This relationship between specific performance and commer-
cial impracticability was reversed somewhat in Gay v. Seafarer
Fiberglass Yachts, Inc."t The court was willing to decree specific
performance of a contract to build a customized boat, which ad-
mittedly would be unique, until the defendant pleaded "impossi-
bility of performance" under common law and "excuse by failure
of presupposed conditions" under UCC 2-615. The court held
that:
Were it not for defendant's assertions concerning the oil short-
age and energy crisis (and the precepts governing motions for
summary judgment), it would have granted judgment to the
78. UCC §2-615, Comment 4.
79. 284 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
80. Id. at 1111.
81. 14 UCC REP. SERv. 1335 (1974).
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extent of mandating specific performance of the contract. Ac-
cordingly, plaintiff is granted leave to renew the motion at the
trial of the action, should defendant fail to prove that the rise
in costs was caused by the oil shortage.2
In the past five years at least four significant cases have arisen
which face the conflict directly. In Orange & Rockland Util.,
Inc. v. Amerda Hess Corp.,'. the court decided in favor of the
plaintiff, using an expanded "other proper circumstances" test.
The plaintiff utilities company was required by the New York
State Air Pollution Control Board to use crude oil #6. The de-
fendant had agreed to supply the oil at $2.14 per barrel through
September 1974. The defendant allegedly was forced by unfore-
seen market changes to increase its prices, and the plaintiff re-
fused to pay. The defendant, therefore, threatened to cut off its
supply. The plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order
and on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the defendant
raised the defense of commercial impracticability under Section
2-615. Defendant also alleged that plaintiff had an adequate rem-
edy at law. In Orange & Rockland, the court held:
In an ordinary commercial transaction, the ability to compute
specific dollar damages would preclude the granting of injunc-
tive relief. (citations omitted) Here, however, plaintiff has a
specialized and unique status as a public utility . . . [Gleneral
public users and consumers are the persons who would be dra-
matically and adversely affected . . . . In balancing the equi-
ties, the Court must consider the public interest. ...
. . . [W]elfare of the general public is the major factor in the
decisional process.4
Uniqueness, not of the goods, but of the buyer was an aspect
which had never been considered prior to this case. This appears
to be a major step toward liberalization of the uniqueness test for
specific performance. Yet, nowhere in Section 2-716 does the term
uniqueness refer to the purchaser of the goods. More specifically,
uniqueness is to be considered when the goods are analyzed, not
the purchaser. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to classify
82. Id. at 1336-38.
83. 67 Misc.2d 560, 324 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup.Ct. 1971).
84. Id. at 563-64, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 498-99.
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this case under the "other proper circumstances" test rather than
the uniqueness test.
The Section 2-615/2-716 conflict arose again in Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp." Gulf had a long-term contract with
Eastern to supply aviation fuel. Gulf sent a written demand to
Eastern stating that it would shut off Eastern's supply of jet fuel
if Eastern did not meet its price increase within 15 days. Eastern
brought an action for specific performance which was granted
since the "events associated with the so-called energy crisis were
reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was executed.""
As in Orange & Rockland, 7 the conflict was resolved by negating
the Section 2-615 commercial impracticability defense and up-
holding its decree for specific performance because of the "other
proper circumstances."
In Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.," the court again awarded
a decree for specific performance. The defendant, Amoco, had
agreed to supply propane gas to the plaintiff on a long-term
basis."8 During the winter of 1972-73, Amoco experienced a
shortage of propane and voluntarily placed all of its customers,
including Laclede, on an 80% allocation basis. After Laclede
objected, Amoco notified Laclede that the price of propane had
increased by three cents per gallon. Later, Amoco informed the
plaintiff that the contract was terminated because of "lack of
mutuality" in the contract."
The appellate court made use of the "other proper circumstan-
ces" test of 2-716 to order specific performance. The court ac-
knowledged that Laclede presently could "cover" by purchasing
propane on the open market, but felt that the "long-term supply
of propane" was not assured. Indeed, relying on expert testimony,
the court found "that Laclede probably could not find another
supplier of propane willing to enter into a long-term contract such
as the Amoco agreement, given the uncertain future of worldwide
supplies."'"
85. 19 UCC REP. SERV. 721 (1975).
86. Id. at 737.
87. 67 Misc.2d 560, 324 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup.Ct. 1971).
88. 17 UCC REP. SERV. 447 (1975).
89. Id. at 448.
90. Id. at 450.
91. Id. at 452.
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Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly the most finan-
cially important case to present the conflict between specific per-
formance and commercial impracticability is Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.92 Westinghouse informed
T.V.A., and other utilities operations around the country," that
it considered continuation of its long-term nuclear fuel supply
contracts to be "commercially impracticable." 4 Realizing that
they would have to renegotiate their long-term contracts at much
higher prices or go without nuclear fuel,95 T.V.A. sought specific
performance under Section 2-716.
This case raises many of the factual and interpretive considera-
tions courts will have to weigh. Both seller and buyer will demand
a liberal interpretation of their respective Code sections. And
both seller and buyer will be justified in their demand. 6 From our
discussion above, it is clear that the trend toward the liberaliza-
tion of Section 2-716 provides a very potent weapon for the buyer.
Once a Section 2-716 high, hard fastball is thrown at the seller,
he has only one mighty swing in defense. And if he misses, his
strike-out could cost him billions of dollars. From the cases
which have resolved the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict, it appears
that the buyers have the advantage.9 This is supported further
92. 18 UCC REP. SERV. 945, 69 FRD 5 (1975). The financial aspects have been men-
tioned in The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30, 1976, at 1, col. 6, wherein one Westinghouse
spokesman is quoted as saying that an adverse legal decision could cost Westinghouse two
billion dollars over two decades.
93. These cases have been consolidated for discovery purposes, and the litigation is
currently in process. No officially recorded decisions on these matters are available at the
time of this printing.
94. T.V.A. v. Westinghouse, 18 UCC REP. SERv. 945, 69 FRD 5, 6 (1975).
95. Westinghouse is the principal supplier of this nuclear fuel to most utilities in the
East and Southeast. No other company has the capacity to produce this particular type
of fuel at the needed quantity. See The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
96. For seller's justification, see Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73. For buyer's
justification see UCC §2-716, Comment 1.
97. The swing is commercial impracticability, UCC §2-615.
98. See note 92 supra.
99. Of the six cases decided and discussed above, five were decided in favor of the buyer
(G.W.S. Service Stations Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 Misc.2d 40, 346 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup.Ct.
1973); Orange & Rockland Util., Inc. v. Amerda Hess Corp., 67 Misc.2d 560, 324 N.Y.S.2d
494 (Sup.Ct. 1971); T.V.A. v. Mason Coal, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Tenn. 1974);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 19 UCC REP. SERV. 721 (1975); Laclede Gas Co.
v. Amoco Oil Co., 17 UCC REP. SERV. 447 (1975), and only one offered the seller the chance
of proving a §2-615 defense (Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 UCC REP. SERV.
1335 (1974)).
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by the authors' historical study of commercial impracticability."',
However, this is not necessarily the wisest resolution, nor the one
most in accord with the overall interpretive mandates of the
Code. '0'
Resolution of the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict must come from
the liberal interpretation of both sections."'2 In addition to the
mandate of Section 1-102, the courts must consider fairness to
both parties when specific performance is sought.""' Initially, a
court must determine whether the use of either commercial im-
practicability or a decree of specific performance is valid in the
case as presented. If a buyer could cover reasonably under Section
2-712,'"' he should be prevented from seeking a specific perform-
ance decree. We have seen, however, that a drastic rise in price
makes cover an extremely difficult buyer's remedy. This, in turn,
gives rise to the "other proper circumstances" test of Section 2-
716. Indeed, the typical Section 2-716/2-615 conflict occurs when
the price of the contracted good unforeseeably rises. In these situ-
ations, it is natural for the court to consider a specific perform-
ance decree.
However, courts also must consider the validity of the Section
2-615 defense. Rise in market price alone is surely not enough to
permit a seller to abrogate his contract. 0 ' But the situations
which have presented the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict are usually
situations which involve a rise in price coupled with an alleged
"unforeseen circumstance" such as a crop failure, " a war em-
bargo,' 07 an oil embargo,' 8 or a labor dispute."'" The court is man-
100. Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73.
101. UCC §1-102.
102. Id. See also Comment 1 to §1-102 which reads, in part:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of
the rule or principle in question, . . . and the application of the language should
be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the
purposes and policies involved. (emphasis added)
103. It should be noted that UCC §2-716 is a codified "equitable" remedy. The word
"proper" in §2-716(1) recognizes this fact. As such, courts must consider the granting of
specific performance in light of the needs of both parties and the fairness of the decree.
104. UCC §2-712.
105. Id. §2-615, Comment 4, "Increased cost alone does not excuse performance. ...."
106. See, e.g., Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, 377 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ala.
1974).
107. See, e.g., Glick v. Beer, 263 App. Div. 599, 33 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1942).
108. See, e.g., T.V.A. v. Westinghouse, 18 UCC REP. SE-v. 945, 69 FRD 5 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363
(Mass. 1974).
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dated to consider the "commercial character" or commercial set-
ting in which the problem arose."' If a seller has diminished sup-
plies of a contracted good, and future supplies are impracticable
to procure, the Code itself mandates an allocation of the remain-
ing supplies to all customers in a fair and reasonable manner. In
the past, however, courts have been reluctant to immerse them-
selves in the waters of commercial impracticability, often incor-
rectly using the elements of common law impossibility to negate
the commercial impracticability defense."' Instead, courts have
preferred the liberal notions of specific performance, resulting in
a balance in favor of the buyer." 2
The difficult case is the one presenting the factual elements of
T. V.A. v. Westinghouse."3 It is not impossible for the seller to
perform, for the seller is capable of producing the good required.
However, he often must do this at considerable, if not prohibitive
expense."' The buyer, on the other hand, wants the seller to per-
form, as the seller is the only person capable of filling the order
in the quantities demanded or at the quality needed." 5 It appears
likely that this particular kind of Section 2-716/2-615 conflict is
one that increasingly will raise its head in the shortage economy
of the 1970's and 80's. Fortunately, the Code provides a mecha-
nism based on sound economic theory and equitable considera-
tions which can resolve this dispute.
Resolution of the Specific Performance-Commercial
Impracticability Conflict
All sections of the Code are to be interpreted liberally to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies." 6 The purposes and
policies are expressly codified as simplifying, clarifying, modern-
izing, and making uniform commercial transactions so that com-
110. UCC §2-615, Comment 3.
111. Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73, at 13-14.
112. See note 99 supra.
113. T.V.A. v. Westinghouse, 18 UCC REP. SERV. 945, 69 FRD 5 (1975).
114. See note 92 supra.
115. Id.
116. UCC §1-102.
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mercial practices can continue to expand."7 The waste and high
"transaction costs""' of litigation fees and inadequate remedies
were the very reasons businessmen demanded a uniform commer-
cial code. In a very real sense, they were seeking a uniform statute
which would "maximize resources""' while minimizing social
costs. The economic impact of the UCC is both expressly man-
dated,'2" and supported by scholarly legal commentary.'2'
Presently, the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict forces courts to use
a double-edged sword. If a court saves the buyer by ordering
specific performance, the seller can be mortally wounded. 2 2 If the
seller is saved by commercial impracticability, the buyer receives
no fair or just compensation.' 3 Furthermore, the tendency of past
courts to favor specific performance over commercial impractica-
bility' 4 can result only in sellers refusing to engage in long-term
contracts."' This, in turn, affects the buyers' ability to secure
goods on a long-term basis. The direct consequence is an unstable
market situation for both the buyer and the seller. 21
Logically, the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict can best be resolved
by equitably balancing the economic considerations presented. In
the area of nuisance and pollution, for instance, courts are begin-
ning to recognize the value of using economic considerations in
deciding property rights.2 ' The use of economic considerations is
expressly suggested in Comment 6 to Section 2-615.21 The "ex-
117. Id.
118. The term "transaction costs" can be found in recent literature dealing with the
relation between law and economics. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13
(1972). See also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972).
119. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (1972).
120. UCC §1-102(2).
121. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 480 (1970).
122. See note 92 supra.
123. If seller is excused under §2-615, he is excused from all damages. UCC §2-615(a).
124. See note 99 supra.
125. Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73, at 13.
126. Id. at 13-14.
127. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700
(1972); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970).
128. UCC §2-615, Comment 6 reads:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when
the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse,' adjustment under the
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cuse" or "no excuse" dilemma presented by the commercial im-
practicability defense must be resolved by a sense of justice com-
ing from a reading of "all provisions in light of their purpose."'2
The court is mandated to use equitable principles in furtherance
of commercial standards and good faith. What this means in real
life is that courts, faced with the kind of controversy presented
in T. V.A. v. Westinghouse,"" must fashion an equitable decree
which does justice to both parties. Merely choosing between Sec-
tion 2-615 and Section 2-716 will not suffice.
When Westinghouse engaged in the long-term contract to sup-
ply nuclear fuel to T.V.A., it anticipated that the price agreed
upon would reflect its cost plus a reasonable profit. T.V.A., in
turn, could calculate its purchaser's cost on a long-term basis,
and make other long-term decisions in light of its cost."' The
tremendous rise in the basic cost of producing the nuclear fuel,
allegedly due to the dramatic increase in the cost of petroleum
necessary to manufacture the nuclear fuel, was estimated to
range in the billions of dollars.'' 2 This fact situation illustrates
how, if the court favors buyers with a specific performance decree,
or excuses sellers under Section 2-615, the other contracting party
bears an inordinate burden."' Equitable and economic considera-
tions mandate a decree which will not shift such a burden so
arbitrarily. Indeed, courts have resolved such a conflict in pre-
Code law in an equitable and economically feasible manner."
The most economically feasible resolution to the conflict would
be to grant the buyer a decree for specific performance in those
cases in which the seller actually can produce the goods in accord-
ance with the long-term contract.' 5 But, in fairness to the seller,
various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good
faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions in the
light of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable princi-
ples in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
129. Id.
130. 18 UCC REP. SERV. 945, 69 FRD 5 (1975).
131. Id.
132. See note 99 supra.
133. UCC §2-615(a).
134. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965). In this case, the court made plaintiff and defendant split the
costs.
135. This was the situation in T.V.A. v. Westinghouse, 18 UCC REP. SERV. 945, 69 FRD
5 (1975).
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the decree necessarily must include a rewriting of the price term
to reflect the increased cost to seller. A decree could be fashioned
which permits the seller to charge the buyer the actual cost of
producing the fuel, plus the percentage of profit the seller would
have made on the contract, had the unforeseen circumstances not
occurred."' This would permit the seller to continue the contract
without going out of business'37 and also prevent him from obtain-
ing the windfall profits which could occur when goods become
scarce and he is free to sell the goods on the open market.' The
buyer, in turn, gets what he wants, the goods. However, justice
demands that he pay the minimal increased production costs,
plus the percentage profit to the seller he originally agreed to pay.
The usual result will be that the buyer will get the goods at
something more than the agreed contract price, but certainly far
less than the current scarce commodity market price.'39
This approach seems to be in total accord with the purposes set
out in Section 1-102, and reflects the liberal construction called
for in interpreting both Section 2-615 and Section 2-716. As such,
the Section 2-615/2-716 conflict can be resolved through the in-
herent flexibility of the Code itself. 40 In addition, its resolution
secures the availability of long-term contracts, so needed in a
rapidly changing economic world. '
136. For a simplified understanding of this principle, consider the following: Seller
agrees to sell to buyer coffee at $50.00 per ton on a ten-year long-term contract. At the
time of formation of the contract, seller's cost for procuring the beans was $40.00. He
received a $10.00 profit per ton, or a 25% overall profit on his cost. If a crop shortage results
and the cost of procuring the coffee rises to $80.00 per ton due to this unforeseen circum-
stance, the court will order specific performance, but re-write the price term. Buyer will
now pay $80.00 plus 25% or $100.00 per ton.
137. For a discussion of the need to consider the adverse effect of a company going out
of business, see Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73, at 14.
138. Scarce commodities naturally draw a higher price on the open market, and the
percentage of profit similarly will increase. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY
ECONOMiCS 296-97 (3d ed. 1972).
139. See note 136 supra. In this hypothetical, the retail market price due to the unfore-
seen crop failure may well have risen to $120.00 per ton. Under our formula, buyer could
purchase from seller at $150.00 per ton ($120.00 plus the percentage profit of $30.00).
140. UCC §1-102, Comment 1.
141. Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 73, at 14.
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CONCLUSION
Hopefully, this Article has provided the historical basis to un-
derstand and accept the increasingly liberal granting of specific
performance. The rigid common law shackles on the courts of
equity have given way to the flexibility needed in today's com-
mercial world. Specific performance, along with commercial im-
practicability, are two of the more obscure and long neglected
aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code which will become more
and more prominent. There is no doubt that the courts will be
called on to clarify, and perhaps even to expand further, the
"other proper circumstances" in which specific performance may
be invoked. They also will be called on to resolve the Section 2-
716/2-615 conflict in a wider variety of circumstances as our econ-
omy changes, shortages develop, and scarce commodities in-
crease. This Article suggests an economic perspective from which
the Section 2-716/2-615 conflict can be analyzed. It is certainly
not the only approach, but one which appears to be viable and
in accord with the Code's expressed purposes. It represents one
of the characteristics of the UCC for which the drafters can be
justly proud, the Code's inherent flexibility in the ever-changing
commercial world.
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